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1025 
DIGITIZING TRIBAL LAW:  
HOW CODIFICATION PROJECTS SUCH AS 
TRIBAL LAW ONLINE COULD GIVE NEW RISE 
TO AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
“Well, neither could . . . anybody, right? I mean if anybody could find 
it, you could. It’s because it’s not published anywhere, right?” 
 —Chief Justice John Roberts, in response to being told by an 
attorney arguing for the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe that his office 
had been unable to discover applicable Cheyenne River Sioux 
precedent.1  
INTRODUCTION  
“Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign entities–
the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes.”2 The oft-
forgotten American Indian nations have inherent sovereignty to govern 
themselves, by virtue of their existing as cultural and political entities prior 
to the founding of the United States.3 Federally recognized American Indian 
nations thus have intrinsic authority and jurisdiction over their internal 
 
 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–32, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle 
Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-
411.pdf. 
 2. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 
1, 1 (1997).  
 3. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding that American Indian Nations are not 
subject to the Constitution of the United States because they are a “separate people . . . thus far not 
brought under the laws of the Union, or of the State within whose limits they resided”) (quoting United 
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886)); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) 
(classifying American Indian Nations as explicit sovereigns, and holding that the “treaties and laws of 
the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states”).  
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affairs; tribal4 governments perform executive, judicial, and legislative 
functions.5 
Despite this fact, most of the federally recognized tribes in the United 
States have not formally published or codified their laws.6 What is codified 
is usually out of date and almost never digitized or published in an online 
forum.7 The online databases that do contain tribal laws are “incomplete and 
are often plagued by broken links, outdated laws, unsearchable documents, 
and unreadable images.”8 Accessing these laws and applying them in tribal 
courts is often very difficult, even for attorneys working for American 
Indian nations with access to whatever databases exist.9 
The Pine Ridge Reservation, located in South Dakota, provides an all-
too-typical example. The Reservation, which is home to the Oglala Sioux 
Tribe, last formally codified its laws in 1996.10 Thus, hundreds of enacted 
ordinances and resolutions that have been passed by the Oglala Sioux Tribal 
Council have not been included in this codification, which is thus decades 
out of date.11 While there is an online database that has collected the 
ordinances and resolutions passed by the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council since 
 
 
 4. Throughout this Note, I have chosen to use the term “tribal law” to refer generally to the laws 
created by American Indian Nations. This is for two reasons. First, the Center for Empirical Research in 
the Law has chosen the moniker “Tribal Law Online” to refer to its codification and publication project. 
See Interview with Steve Gunn, Attorney for the Oglala Sioux Tribe and Associate Professor at the 
Washington University School of Law, in Saint Louis, Mo. (Jan. 18, 2016); discussion infra 
Introduction. Second, the people of the Oglala Sioux Tribe have chosen to use the term “tribe” to refer 
to themselves. See CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE OF THE PINE RIDGE 
RESERVATION Jan. 15, 1936. I personally prefer using the term “nation” instead, because I believe it 
better encapsulates the sovereign status of American Indian nations. I also think that the word “tribe” 
can have some pejorative connotations. See also AKIM D. REINHARDT, RULING PINE RIDGE: OGLALA 
LAKOTA POLITICS FROM THE IRA TO WOUNDED KNEE (PLAINS HISTORIES) xxv–xxvi (2009) (arguing 
that the history of the term “tribe” makes its application to American Indian Nations problematic, but 
respecting the choices of the American Indian nations that have decided to use the term).  
 5. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2016).  
 6. See Bonnie Shucha, “Whatever Tribal Precedent There May Be”: The (Un)availability of 
Tribal Law, 106 LAW LIBR. J. 199 (2014) (describing the inaccessibility of the law of American Indian 
nations, due in part to the lack of formal publishing or codification); The Oglala Sioux Tribe, Application 
of the Oglala Sioux Tribe for the Bush Foundation Nation Building Grant at 3–4 (July 1, 2015) (on file 
with author) (stating that “[l]ocating authoritative sources of tribal constitutions, codes, and court 
decisions is extremely difficult,” due in part to the lack of formal publishing).  
 7. See Shucha, supra note 6 (describing the lack of online databases systematically publishing the 
laws of American Indian nations); Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe for the Bush Foundation Nation 
Building Grant, supra note 6, at 3–4 (“Most tribes have not digitized their laws . . . . they have not 
integrated the laws, ordinances, and resolutions subsequently adopted into an updated code.”).  
 8. See Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra note 6, at 3.  
 9. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4.  
 10. Id.; see also Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra note 6, at 4.  
 11. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4; Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra 
note 6, at 4. 
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then, this database is organized solely by date and ordinance number and 
consists wholly of PDF images that cannot be word-searched.12 Only 
individuals with permission from the Oglala Sioux Tribe have access to this 
database,13 and there is no reporter systematically publishing the decisions 
made by Oglala courts online.14 
Any lawyer wishing to practice law in Pine Ridge has an immensely 
difficult time tracking down the law. Imagine that a client has a civil dispute 
with either the Oglala Sioux Tribe itself or one of its members. To discover 
applicable law, the lawyer will need to chase down a copy of the Law and 
Order Code of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. However, that law is nearly two 
decades out of date. To adequately search for applicable ordinances and 
resolutions, the lawyer will have to search through the Tribe’s online 
database to see if there is any applicable law that has modified the Law and 
Order Code. Keep in mind that taking this step is predicated on the lawyer 
having access to the database, which can only be obtained with the Tribe’s 
permission. There is no way to chase down case law short of visiting the 
Oglala courts and leafing through their slip opinions one by one.15  
Also understand that it is entirely possible (even likely) that the lawyer 
will find two separate laws that overlap or conflict with one another.16 This 
is because the Tribal Council and its attorneys have the same difficulties as 
the lawyer in discovering existing tribal law, and may pass a new law 
without being able to reasonably locate laws that may already apply.17  
The extreme unavailability of tribal law on the Pine Ridge Reservation 
 
 
 12. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4 (discussing an online database maintained by the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe that cannot be accessed without the Oglala Sioux Tribe’s permission). The PDFs on 
the Oglala Sioux Tribe’s database are images that have not been converted into text using optical 
character recognition technology. Id. A version of the Law and Order Code is also available with some 
amendments at the National Indian Law Library (“NILL”) website. See The Oglala Sioux Tribe, Oglala 
Sioux Tribe: Law and Order Code, NATIONAL INDIAN LAW LIBRARY, 
http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/oglala_sioux/index.html (Nov. 2010). However, this code is also very out 
of date, and the NILL recommends that readers “contact the tribe” for the “official” version of the code. 
Id.  
 13. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4. 
 14. Id. The Oglala Sioux Tribe has a two-tiered court system consisting of trial courts and a 
Supreme Court that present written opinions, which remain unpublished in a systematic way. Id. While 
the Indian Law Reporter does publish a few Oglala court decisions, its coverage is not comprehensive, 
and the reporter is only available in print form. Id; see also The Indian Law Reporter, AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., www.indianlawreporter.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2016).  
 15. Excepting the occasional appellate opinion that may be published in the Indian Law Reporter. 
See The Indian Law Reporter, supra note 14.  
 16. While the general rule is that newer laws supersede older laws, there have been instances in 
which Oglala Courts, similarly finding trouble with discovering available precedent, have cited 
superseded Oglala law to support their opinions. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4.  
 17. Id.  
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and the many reservations like it has made it prohibitively expensive and 
time-intensive to practice law and represent parties in Oglala courts. It has 
also made it difficult to attract business to the Reservation, since businesses 
worry that discovering applicable law that could apply to future disputes 
may be very difficult and costly.18 Perhaps worst of all, the state of the law 
in Indian nations has made it more difficult for these nations to resolve the 
issues that they face.19 
Luckily, the digital age may provide ways that could help American 
Indian nations overcome these problems. The Center for Empirical 
Research in the Law (CERL), an institution operating at the Washington 
University School of Law, partnered with the Oglala Sioux Tribe in the 
summer of 2015 to “bring together all the laws and court decisions of the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe and make them easily accessible and highly visible to 
all Tribal members and to the public on a searchable online database,” which 
they have called Tribal Law Online.20 CERL aims to bring this database up 
to date and make it available in 2017.21 The Oglala Sioux Tribe will formally 
adopt the codification when it has been completed, and will be able to 
supplement and add to it as new laws are passed.22 
Tribal Law Online could help promote the self-governance of the Oglala 
Sioux Tribe in many obvious ways. For one, it will increase the ability of 
Oglala citizens to see and evaluate their current laws, and make it easier for 
them to communicate their concerns and needs to the Oglala Sioux Tribal 
Council.23 It will also make it much easier to practice law on the 
Reservation, and help the Oglala Sioux Courts when issuing new 
precedent.24 It will also likely make doing business on the Reservation a far 
more attractive prospect.25  
However, there are even greater possible benefits to the sovereignty of 
American Indian nations that this project could serve, and some potential 
pitfalls that need to be avoided. This Note focuses on less-visible but 
potentially critical ways that Tribal Law Online and undertakings like it 
could advance American Indian sovereignty in the United States. It also 
 
 
 18. Id.  
 19. See discussion infra Part I.  
 20. See Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra note 6, at 3. This project is being funded by 
a grant from the Bush Foundation and is currently under way. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra 
note 4.  
 21. See Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra note 6, at 12.  
 22. See id. at 12.  
 23. See id. at 4.  
 24. See id. at 5. 
 25. Id. at 4.  
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addresses potential criticisms. 
Part I of this Note will focus on the ways that Tribal Law Online could 
be beneficial to American Indian sovereignty. It discusses how codification 
and digitization will improve Supreme Court recognition of American 
Indian sovereignty, benefit American Indian nations economically, help 
them obtain more favorable legislation from Congress, and aid American 
Indians in shaping their governments to more accurately reflect their 
cultures. Part II will address potential criticisms of codification and 
digitization, including fears that allowing nonmembers to codify Oglala law 
could cause the laws to less accurately reflect Oglala interests, that 
codification itself could involve the imposition of Anglo-American 
jurisprudential norms, and that codification could harm existing Oglala 
customary law. This Note will ultimately conclude that Tribal Law Online 
and projects like it could potentially advance American Indian sovereignty 
to a degree heretofore unseen since the founding of the United States. 
I. HOW TRIBAL LAW ONLINE COULD AID THE CAUSE OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
There are numerous ways that Tribal Law Online could aid the cause of 
American Indian sovereignty in the United States should other nations join 
in on it or other similar projects. This Part will focus on just a few of those 
potential benefits, including how it could (A) increase Supreme Court 
respect for American Indian sovereignty, (B) benefit the economies of 
American Indian nations, (C) gain increased trust from Congress and obtain 
increasingly favorable applications of legislative power, and (D) help the 
culture of individual Nations play a larger role in shaping tribal laws and 
government.  
A. Improving Supreme Court Recognition of American Indian Sovereignty 
It is no secret that American Indian interests have been disfavored by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in recent years.26 Congress’s respect for American 
Indian sovereignty during the “Self Determination Era”27 has been 
 
 
 26. American Indian interests lost in 77% of the cases heard before the Supreme Court between 
1986 and 2000. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, 
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280–81 (2001). 
 27. The period of Congressional policy towards American Indian Nations following 1968 has been 
generally termed the “Self-Determination Era,” reflecting Congress’s decision to promote tribal self-
government in contrast to previous policies. ROBERT T. ANDERSON, BETHANY BERGER, PHILIP P. 
FRICKEY & SARAH KRAKOFF, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 152 (2d ed. 2010). 
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frequently frustrated by the Supreme Court, which has evinced a willingness 
to abrogate American Indian sovereignty since 1986.28 One line of cases 
clearly displays the Supreme Court’s inclination towards abrogating 
protections that previous courts extended to American Indian nations: the 
Montana cases.29 In this subpart, this Note will examine modern Supreme 
Court Montana decisions and discuss how they show serious distrust for 
American Indian legal institutions. It will then explain how the Tribal Law 
Online project could help to increase the respect of the Supreme Court for 
these institutions. 
The Montana line of cases concern the civil jurisdiction American Indian 
nations have over non-members for actions occurring within reservation 
borders.30 Montana held that “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power 
to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”31 The Court also held that a 
tribe could extend civil jurisdiction over “the activities of nonmembers who 
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements” and over 
“non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens 
or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe.”32 The Supreme Court thus determined 
that “absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes lack civil 
authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land within a 
 
 
It has been characterized by legislation generally promoting tribal self-government, such as the Indian 
Child Welfare Act and the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. Id. at 156–57.  
 28. American Indian interests won 58% of the cases heard by the Supreme Court between 1969 
and 1986. See Getches, supra note 26, at 280–81.  
 29. Named for Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), which determined that the Crow 
did not have authority to regulate fishing and hunting by nonmembers of the Nation on trust land held 
by nonmembers within the Reservation. 
 30. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (applying the Montana test and 
determining that the Navajo did not have the authority to collect a hotel occupancy tax on a hotel run by 
a nonmember on nonmember owned fee land on the Reservation); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438 (1997) (applying the Montana test and determining that American Indian courts on the Ft. Berthold 
reservation had no civil authority over a tort that occurred on a North Dakota owned right-of-way 
running through the Reservation).  
 31. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. “Fee land” refers to land acquired by non-Indian settlers because of 
the General Allotment Act and the Burke Act. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1, 10–11 (1995). Between the passage of these Acts and the Indian Reorganization Act, which 
formally ended the allotment practice, approximately 27 million acres of Reservation land had been 
given to non-Indians. Id. at 12. A large majority of this land remains possessed by non-Indians, meaning 
that much of the land formally within the borders of American Indian reservations are not held by 
American Indian parties. Id. at 17–18. Montana established that fee land so held is treated differently 
for the purposes of civil jurisdiction. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.  
 32. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. 
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reservation,” subject to the two above exceptions.33 
Nevada v. Hicks drastically departed from previous Montana cases by 
using the Montana test to invalidate the jurisdiction of the Fallon Paiute-
Shoshone Nation to adjudicate a tort that originated on land owned by a 
member.34 In that case, a member of the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Nation 
claimed that two Nevada state officials, while executing a search warrant, 
had damaged a mounted sheep head that he kept within his home.35 He sued 
the two state officials in the Paiute-Shoshone Court for “trespass to land and 
chattels, abuse of process, and violation of civil rights . . . each remediable 
under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”36 The defendants sought a declaratory 
judgment in a Federal District Court that the tribal court lacked the 
jurisdiction necessary to hear the tort claims.37 The Supreme Court 
unanimously agreed that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
claim.38 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the fact that Floyd 
Hicks’ home was “on tribe-owned land within the reservation” did “[n]ot 
necessarily” provide the Tribe with the right to adjudicate the dispute.39 He 
determined that the possessory status of the land was “only one factor to 
consider” when determining whether an American Indian Nation had civil 
jurisdiction over an issue involving non-members.40 Instead, Scalia wrote 
that American Indian nations retained civil jurisdiction over non-members 
only “to the extent ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations.’”41 He then ultimately decided that the “authority to 
regulate state officers in executing process relating to the violation, off 
reservation, of state laws” was not essential to those interests, and so denied 
jurisdiction.42 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in this case has boggled numerous legal scholars 
because it diverges so strongly from other Montana cases holding that the 
status of the land was dispositive43 over whether an American Indian Nation 
had civil jurisdiction over non-members.44 Multiple precedents stood 
 
 
 33. Strate, 520 U.S. at 446.  
 34. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).  
 35. Id. at 356–57.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 357.  
 38. Id. at 369. 
 39. Id. at 359.  
 40. Id. at 360.  
 41. Id. at 359 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.544, 564–65 (1981)).  
 42. Id. at 364.  
 43. Subject to the above-mentioned Montana exceptions. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. 
 44. See Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75, 94 (2003) 
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against this argument. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, decided four years prior, 
framed the Montana test as determining whether American Indian nations 
have civil authority to regulate “the conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian 
land within a reservation.”45 It tacitly accepted the idea that the Montana 
test applied only to non-Indian land within a Reservation. In Atkinson 
Trading Co. v. Shirley, which was decided less than a month before Hicks, 
the Court also emphasized the character of the land, holding that “[a]n 
Indian tribe’s sovereign power to tax—whatever its derivation—reaches no 
further than tribal land.”46 
Perhaps most condemning to Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the case 
law is Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. That case concerned a severance 
tax that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe levied on oil and gas extracted from 
Jicarilla lands.47 A group of oil companies that had been leasing Jicarilla 
lands to extract oil and gas sued to enjoin the tax as exceeding the civil 
authority of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe over nonmembers.48 The Supreme 
Court ruled that the imposition of the tax was within the power of the Tribe, 
holding that its right to tax did not derive “from its power to exclude . . . 
persons from tribal lands” because that proposition contradicted “the 
conception that Indian tribes are domestic, dependent nations, as well as the 
common understanding that sovereign taxing power is a tool for raising 
revenue necessary to cover the costs of the government.”49 What makes this 
 
 
(characterizing Justice Scalia’s opinion as abandoning Montana doctrine regarding the status of land); 
Melanie Reed, Note, Native American Sovereignty Meets a Bend in the Road: Difficulties in Nevada v. 
Hicks, 2002 BYU L. REV. 137, 162 (pointing out that “case law suggests that the majority in Hicks 
mischaracterized Montana when it dismissed land ownership as only one factor in the analysis of a 
tribe’s jurisdiction”); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense out of Nevada v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 
14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347, 356 (2001) (stating that “the Montana Court was very explicit” in treating 
“Indian land differently from non-Indian lands for the purpose of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers”); 
cf. Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional 
Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 407 (2003) 
(castigating Hicks and its “sub-rosa abandonment of longstanding presumptions in law that sustained 
tribal jurisdiction” as an “intentional . . . judicial microbe that endangers the cultural and political life of 
American Indians”). It is worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court’s view of tribal jurisdiction 
over nonmembers may be changing. A recent Fifth Circuit case that accepted tribal jurisdiction over a 
tort claim against a nonmember was affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band 
of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), affirmed by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2159 
(2016). That said, Dolgencorp was not officially decided under Hicks. Id. at 173–74. Instead of 
determining that the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians had jurisdiction based on some fact 
distinguishing it from Hicks, the Fifth Circuit found jurisdiction on the basis of the Montana 
“commercial relationship” exception. Id. he Supreme Court has not touched on the Hicks ruling since 
making its decision.  
 45. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997).  
 46. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001).  
 47. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1982).  
 48. Id. at 136.  
 49. Id. at 137, 141. Another aspect of Justice Scalia’s opinion that has been significantly criticized 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/9
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case so damaging to Justice Scalia’s interpretation of case law in Hicks is 
that the majority opinion in Merrion, despite being decided after Montana,50 
makes no mention of the Montana test at all. This omission is telling, 
because both cases concern the civil authority of American Indian nations 
over non-members. The Supreme Court has since read the Merrion decision 
as applying only when American Indian nations exercise civil authority over 
non-members for actions occurring on Indian-owned land within a 
reservation.51 Hicks has been interpreted by many scholars as a significant 
departure from previous case law on this subject.52  
Something must have motivated the Supreme Court to deviate from 
precedent in Hicks. Legal scholars have offered multiple explanations.53 
Justice Souter articulated at least one motivation that influenced a portion 
of the court in his concurring opinion. Towards the end of his opinion (in 
which he is joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy), Souter states: 
“Tribal courts also differ from other American courts (and often from 
one another) in their structure, in the substantive law they apply, and 
in the independence of their judges. Although some modern tribal 
courts ‘mirror American courts’ and ‘are guided by written codes, 
rules, procedures, and guidelines,’ tribal law is still frequently 
unwritten, being based instead ‘on the values, mores, and norms of a 
tribe and expressed in its customs, traditions, and practices,’ and is 
often ‘handed down orally or by example from one generation to 
 
 
is his rejection of “tribal authority to regulate nonmembers’ activities on land over which the tribe could 
not ‘assert a landowner’s right to occupy and exclude.’” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) 
(quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 456). This has been interpreted by many scholars as contradicting Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Merrion. See Skibine, supra note 44, at 355–56 (“The Court’s biggest oversight 
is that it misconceived the right to exclude, treating it as an ordinary landowner’s right to exclude instead 
of a sovereign right reserved in treaties.”). In many ways, this narrowed view of tribal sovereignty is 
more worrying than the Court’s broadening of Montana. However, this Note is only concerned with the 
latter issue, as it more explicitly exposes the Court’s divergence from previous case law.  
 50. Montana was decided in 1981. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Merrion was 
decided in 1982. Merrion, 455 U.S. 130.  
 51. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001) (distinguishing Merrion from 
the case heard before the Court because Merrion concerned taxation over trust land rather than fee land). 
Again, Atkinson was decided less than one month before Hicks. Id.  
 52. See Braveman, supra note 44; Reed, supra note 44; Skibine, supra note 44. 
 53. See Carole Goldberg, In Theory, In Practice: Judging State Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 81 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2010) (arguing that Hicks was decided because the Supreme Court 
believed that “federal courts and other decision-makers seem to favor state over tribal jurisdiction 
because state jurisdiction is perceived to be more likely to deliver fair and effective justice”); Skibine, 
supra note 44 (arguing that the Court was primarily concerned with the fact that the Tribal Court was 
going to adjudicate a dispute over state officials, and that Hicks ought to be seen as being applicable 
only to its facts); c.f. Braveman, supra note 44, at 95 (pointing out that Hicks created a 
“presumption...against tribal sovereignty over nonmembers, regardless of the status of the land”).  
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another’. The resulting law applicable in tribal courts is a complex 
‘mix of tribal codes and federal, state, and traditional law,” which 
would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.”54 
Several themes permeate this excerpt. First, Justice Souter is clearly 
concerned that nonmembers of the Tribe will be unable to access relevant 
information about the different customs and norms that drive the tribe’s 
legal system. He is similarly concerned that nonmembers may tacitly 
assume that the same protections and processes that apply outside of the 
Reservation apply when they are on American Indian land.55 The last 
sentence also expresses a fear that outsiders will not be able to “sort out” 
the relevant law necessary to adjudicating a dispute.56  
Justices Thomas and Kennedy joined both the majority Opinion and 
Justice Souter’s concurring Opinion.57 That means that two Justices 
currently seated on the Supreme Court have at least partially agreed that 
lack of transparency in tribal law is a valid reason to deny American Indian 
courts adjudicatory authority. Several legal scholars have also read Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion in Strate as illustrating the same principles.58 This may 
also be a motivating factor behind some of the other more recent Supreme 
Court decisions abrogating the sovereignty of Indian nations.59 
Tribal Law Online could help to increase the success of American Indian 
sovereignty interests before the Supreme Court. Collecting and codifying 
the laws of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and its court decisions could increase the 
accessibility of tribal law and invalidate Souter’s criticisms. Indeed, should 
the Tribal Law Online project succeed, the participants’ laws will be easier 
to access than the laws of the separate States via Westlaw, Lexis, or 
Bloomberg, since access to the Tribal Law Online site will be free. 
Abrogating this concern altogether could thus be a significant factor in 
 
 
 54. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384–85 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126, 130–31 (1995)); 
then quoting NAT’L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS’N., INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 43 (1978)). 
 55. See id. at 384 (expressing concern that American Indian Courts do not apply “due process” for 
the purposes of the Indian Civil Rights Act in the same way that federal courts do for the purposes of 
the 5th and 14th Amendments).  
 56. Id. at 385.  
 57. Id. at 355 (majority opinion); id. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring).  
 58. See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 1038 (arguing that “Justice Ginsburg went out of her way to 
praise the alternative state court forum and to stress the unfairness and unfamiliarity of the tribal court”).  
 59. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208, 211 (1978) (invalidating Indian 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, even though Congressional precedent “would probably not be 
sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians if the Tribe otherwise retained such 
jurisdiction” and regardless of the fact that the Court recognized “that some Indian tribal court systems 
have become increasingly sophisticated”).  
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obtaining Supreme Court decisions that are friendlier to American Indian 
sovereignty. 
B. Increasing the Economic Prosperity of Indian Nations 
It is no secret that American Indian nations comprise some of the most 
impoverished areas in the United States.60 The poor economic status of 
Indian Nations has traditionally been ascribed to “poor land quality, 
geographic isolation, and inadequate human capital to manage what few 
assets Indians have.”61 However, recent economic scholarship has shifted 
focus from these characteristics and begun to attribute poor economic 
performance to institutions and their not “credibly committing to a 
consistent rule of law.”62 This is what makes Anderson and Parker argue 
that Public Law 83-280 (“Public Law 280”) ought to be seen as benefiting 
the Indian Nations it has affected, because it has brought the stability and 
rule of law of the States into Indian country and has thus increased their 
economic prosperity.63  
Sociologist Stephen Cornell looked at the institutions and relative 
unemployment levels of sixty-seven American Indian nations and 
concluded that the solution to American Indian poverty involves building 
“a nation in which businesses can flourish . . . creating an environment in 
which the governing infrastructure and the legal infrastructure . . . support 
 
 
 60. See Terry L. Anderson & Dominic P. Parker, Sovereignty, Credible Commitments, and 
Economic Prosperity on American Indian Reservations, 51 J.L. & ECON. 641, 641 (2008) (calling Indian 
Nations “islands of poverty in a sea of wealth”).  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.; see Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1395 (2001) 
(studying countries with histories of colonization, and discovering a correlation between economic 
success and “institutions that enforced the rule of law and encouraged investment”); Robert J. Barro, 
Institutions and Growth, an Introductory Essay, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 145, 147 (1996) (pointing out that 
“[s]everal empirical studies have verified the positive effects on growth and investment from institutions 
that provide secure property rights”); Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries 
Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?, 114 Q.J. ECON. 83, 113–14 (1999) (studying 
the output of multiple countries and discovering that “[c]ountries produce high levels of output per 
worker in the long run because they achieve high rates of investment in physical and human capital and 
because they use these inputs with a high level of productivity”); Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does 
Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251, 1252 
(1997) (concluding that institutions that encourage “trust and civic cooperation are associated with 
stronger economic performance”). 
 63. See Anderson & Parker, supra note 60, at 657–59. Many scholars have wholly disagreed with 
their endorsement of Public Law 280. See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 1044 (advocating that Anderson 
and Parker’s endorsement of Public Law 280 be read with a large degree of skepticism). For more 
discussion of Public Law 280 and the harm it has done to American Indian sovereignty, see discussion 
infra Part I(C)(2).  
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prosperity.”64 Cornell argues that having complete authority over economic 
affairs is a prerequisite to economic prosperity, and further points out that 
“[i]n virtually every case that we have seen of sustained economic 
development on American Indian reservations, the primary economic 
decisions are being made by the tribe, not by outsiders.”65 Cornell further 
argues that Indian institutions, in order to cultivate economic success, must 
cultivate “the separation of politics and business,”66 the “separation of 
government powers,”67 and “effective bureaucracy.”68  
Lastly, and most importantly for Tribal Law Online, Cornell concludes 
that the laws and institutions set in place must culturally match with the 
Indian Nations they serve.69 To make this point, he looks at the boilerplate 
tribal constitutions created in response to the Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA) for the White Mountain Apache and Oglala Sioux Tribes, then 
analyzes the economic differences between the two tribes.70 He argues that 
the relative economic success of the White Mountain Apache can be 
attributed to the fact that the Apache system of governance that existed prior 
to U.S. control more closely resembled the boilerplate constitution adopted 
by the tribe following the IRA.71 This similarity results in the people tending 
“to believe in and support the government,” because it “fits with their 
concept of how authority ought to be organized and exercised.”72 This is 
contrary to the experience of the Oglala Sioux, whose more decentralized 
government73 does not match the strong-centralized government mandated 
by the 1934 Oglala Constitution.74 Because of this, “few people really 
believe in [the Constitution], and where people don’t think the institutions 
are much good, they’re unlikely to invest.”75 
Cornell’s analysis displays another way in which a project such as Tribal 
 
 
 64. Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Policy and Prosperity in Indian Country Today, COMMUNITY 
REINVESTMENT (FED. RES. BK. KS. CITY) 5 (1997), reprinted in ANDERSON, BERGER, FINCKEY & 
KRAKOFF, supra note 27, at 361, 362.  
 65. Id. at 362.  
 66. Id. at 364.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 365.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 366.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. See discussion, infra Part II.  
 74. See Cornell, supra note 64, at 367; CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE OGLALA SIOUX 
TRIBE OF THE PINE RIDGE RESERVATION, Jan. 15, 1936. 
 75. Cornell, supra note 64, at 367; see also Knack & Keefer, supra note 62, at 1252 (concluding 
that institutions that encourage “trust and civic cooperation are associated with stronger economic 
performance”). 
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Law Online could cultivate economic prosperity for American Indian 
nations. Many of the codes that American Indian nations have adopted to 
help curb poverty are model codes made by legal institutions.76 While model 
legal codes have the advantage of being specifically tailored towards 
creating economic prosperity, Cornell’s article makes it clear that the 
general populace needs to believe in the created institutions for them to be 
effective. As such, creating an online publication system such as Tribal Law 
Online would provide affected populations with a greater ability to evaluate 
and vocalize disdain and approval for their respective nations’ codes. The 
legislative process would be much more transparent, which would give 
American Indian voices greater weight in creating the institutions required 
for economic successes. It is hard to imagine that the people would have 
less faith in institutions that were created with greater transparency than in 
model codes simply adopted as-is by American Indian legislatures and 
promptly hidden in inaccessible ordinances and codes. American Indian 
voices, in having a stronger role in creating codes designed to cultivate 
economic prosperity, would create institutions that better reflected their 
respective cultures. 
C. Increasing Congressional Respect for the Sovereignty of American 
Indian Nations 
Even though the current era of Congressional legislation has been 
loosely termed the “self-determination era,”77 federal legislation has not 
been entirely friendly to American Indian sovereignty. This subsection will 
look at three current statutes—Public Law 280,78 the Indian Civil Rights 
Act,79 and the Tribal Law and Order Act80—that have been generally 
 
 
 76. For an example of this, look at the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act Project. See William 
H. Henning, A History and Description of the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act Project (2005) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). This was a model legal code created by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) intended to be adopted by Indian 
Nations to encourage economic growth. Id. (manuscript at 2). While a serious effort was made to “adapt 
the MTSTA to the specific circumstances of the tribes” that adopted it, this effort does not seem to have 
been made with the understanding that American Indian Nations often have significantly different 
cultures and values from one another. Id. (manuscript at 6); see also Cornell, supra note 64, at 365 
(describing the significant differences in the governmental cultures of the Oglala Sioux and White 
Mountain Apache Tribes).  
 77. See ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 27, at 152.  
 78. Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 
1360 (2012)).  
 79. The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301–1341.  
 80. The Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).  
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harmful to American Indian sovereignty. It will also evaluate how Tribal 
Law Online could motivate Congress to abrogate or repeal these laws.  
1. The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Tribal Law and Order Act  
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) was passed in 1968 in response to 
Congressional concerns that American Indian courts, not constrained by the 
Bill of Rights,81 were abusing the civil liberties of tribal residents and failing 
to provide procedural and substantive fairness guarantees.82 In addition to 
imposing certain civil rights guarantees onto American Indian courts,83 
ICRA currently forbids American Indian nations from subjecting criminal 
defendants to a term of imprisonment greater than one year or imposing a 
fine greater than $5,000, except under certain circumstances.84 
For obvious reasons, ICRA has been seen by many legal scholars as 
offensive to the cause of American Indian sovereignty. For one, it imposes 
American jurisprudential norms onto American Indian nations that may or 
may not share them.85 It also critically limits the ability of American Indian 
nations to adjudicate crimes on the reservation. This has caused one legal 
scholar to state that “the message and implication [of the ICRA] is that tribal 
governments do not have jurisdiction over felony crimes.”86 The ICRA and 
Oliphant decision have had the combined effect of nearly eliminating the 
criminal jurisdiction of American Indian nations: Oliphant prevents Indian 
courts from exerting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,87 and ICRA 
prevents Indian courts from proportionally sentencing major crimes.88  
The complicated jurisdictional status of American Indian nations in non-
Public Law 280 states has made the adjudication of major crimes 
extraordinarily difficult. When a major crime has been committed, the 
 
 
 81. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding that American Indian Nations are not 
subject to the Bill of Rights, because the power they exert is not a delegated form of federal power).  
 82. ee Robert Berry, Civil Liberties Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty After the Indian Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, 1 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (1993). This was in spite of the fact that the “more pervasive” abuses 
of Indian rights came at the hands of the “federal government, the states, [and] their political 
subdivisions,” which ICRA did not attempt to remedy. Id. at 21.  
 83. Amongst other guarantees, ICRA prevents American Indian nations from prohibiting free 
speech, participating in unwarranted searches and seizures, making uncompensated takings, and denying 
accused persons the right to a “speedy and public trial.” 28 U.S.C. § 1302(a).  
 84. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(B).  
 85. See Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and 
Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 461 (2005) (castigating ICRA as “yet another imperial 
effort to assimilate tribal governments, by imposing the United States Bill of Rights onto tribal 
governments”).  
 86. Id.  
 87. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).  
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7). 
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perpetrator’s status has to be determined so the authorities can determine 
who has jurisdiction–the Tribe or the federal government.89 Even if the 
Tribe has concurrent criminal jurisdiction over the perpetrator, the Indian 
Civil Rights Act hobbles its sentencing power, meaning that the federal 
government is the only entity with the power to adequately sentence the 
perpetrator of a felony.90 However, federal investigative and prosecutorial 
resources are spread so thin that “federal agents are forced to focus only on 
the highest-profile felonies while letting the investigation of some serious 
crime languish for years.”91 As a result, many of the major criminal offenses 
that occur in Indian country are inadequately adjudicated. 
In response to these troubles, Congress passed the Tribal Law and Order 
Act (“TLOA”) in 2010.92 TLOA made multiple changes to American Indian 
jurisdiction, with the goals of clarifying the jurisdiction of state, federal, and 
tribal bodies; providing tribal bodies with more authority and resources; 
reducing the number of violent crimes committed in Indian country; 
preventing drug trafficking; and streamlining the sharing of information 
between federal, state, and tribal officials.93 Amongst other things,94 TLOA 
amended ICRA by allowing American Indian nations to imprison a 
defendant for up to three years and fine him or her up to $15,000, provided 
that the tribes provide certain procedural guarantees.95 In order to exercise 
the extended sentencing allotments, American Indian nations must “provide 
to the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to 
that guaranteed by the United States Constitution,” “provide an indigent 
defendant the assistance of a defense attorney,” have a licensed and trained 
 
 
 89. See Jasmine Owens, Comment, “Historic” in a Bad Way: How the Tribal Law and Order Act 
Continues the American Tradition of Providing Inadequate Protection to American Indian and Alaska 
Native Rape Victims, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 510 (2012). Federal jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by American Indians on reservations is granted through the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
1153 (2012), and the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).  
 90. See Owens, supra note 89, at 511.  
 91. Id. at 510 (quoting Michael Riley, Promises, Justice Broken: A Dysfunctional System Lets 
Serious Reservation Crimes Go Unpunished and Puts Indians at Risk, DENVER POST (Nov. 11, 2007, 
12:48 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_7429560). Several U.S. attorneys have admitted that federal 
prosecutors tend to shirk and avoid prosecuting crimes that occur on reservations. Id. at 511. Federal 
judges have had similar reactions. Id.  
 92. See The Tribal Law and Order Act, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2261 (2010) (codified in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).  
 93. Id. § 202(b).  
 94. TLOA required the appointment of special prosecutors to assist the federal government in 
adjudicating major crimes in Indian country (Id. at § 213(a)), allowed tribes to request concurrent 
jurisdiction over major crimes with federal and state courts (Id. at § 221(a)), offered federal assistance 
to state and tribal governments that cooperate with one another (Id. at § 222), and extended the federal 
budget to provide for programs and legal representation in American Indian Nations (Id. at § 242(b)). 
 95. Id. § 234(b)-(c).  
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judge, maintain a complete record of criminal proceedings, and, “prior to 
charging the defendant, make publicly available the criminal laws . . . , rules 
of evidence, and rules of criminal procedure . . . of the tribal government.”96 
TLOA presents an immediate way that American Indian nations that 
ascribe to Tribal Law Online could aid their sovereignty. Tribal Law Online 
aims to publish the entire codes of its participants (including those laws 
required by TLOA) and would thus fulfill TLOA’s publishing requirement. 
Tribal Law Online could therefore, at the very least, help participants access 
the higher sentencing provisions allotted by TLOA’s amendments to ICRA. 
Tribal Law Online could also provide a starting place for gaining American 
Indian nations greater freedoms from ICRA. If we accept that ICRA was 
explicitly meant to divest American Indians from having criminal 
jurisdiction over major crimes that occur on their reservations,97 then TLOA 
reveals at least some of the concerns that have prevented Congress from 
simply eliminating ICRA’s sentencing restrictions. Some of the provisions 
provided in TLOA seem to more directly reflect American jurisprudential 
norms, such as providing law-trained judges and giving the defendant a right 
to legal counsel.98 However, the publication requirement seems more 
technically oriented, and may not come at the expense of many American 
Indian nations’ own judicial norms.  
What the TLOA publication requirement shows is that Congress’s 
concerns about the state of tribal law prevent it from simply removing the 
restrictions that the ICRA has placed on American Indian sentencing. 
Should Tribal Law Online prove successful, it may be possible to assuage 
this fear of Congress and cause it to gain respect for American Indian 
sovereignty. It may even help Congress gain critical respect for the 
jurisprudential norms of American Indian nations that guide their criminal 
adjudicative processes.  
2. Public Law 280  
Public Law 280 was passed in 1953, amidst Congressional concerns 
about the adjudication of crimes under federal and American Indian 
 
 
 96. Id. § 234(c).  
 97. See Deer, supra note 85, at 461.  
 98. Many American Indian Nations take alternative approaches to dispute resolution and even 
criminal adjudication. For more on this, see discussion, infra Part II.  
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concurrent jurisdiction.99 Public Law 280 gave six states100 jurisdiction 
(concurrent with the resident tribes) “over offenses committed by or against 
Indians in the areas of Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State 
or Territory has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the 
State or Territory” and gave the state criminal laws “the same force and 
effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State or 
Territory.”101 This amounted to an enormous divesture of the criminal 
adjudicative powers of the American Indian nations caught within Public 
Law 280’s jurisdiction scope. American Indian nations previously shared 
jurisdiction only with the federal government, and then only through the 
provisions given in the Major Crimes Act and the Indian Country Crimes 
Act.102 Now, state law enforcement and criminal adjudication has replaced 
federal law enforcement and criminal adjudication in tribes within Public 
Law 280’s scope.103  
The legislative history of Public Law 280 reveals that one of Congress’s 
primary motivations in passing it was to combat “’lawlessness’ on 
reservations and the ‘absence of adequate tribal institutions for law 
enforcement.’”104 Congress was concerned that “the enforcement of law and 
order among the Indians in the Indian country ha[d] been left largely to the 
Indian groups themselves” and that “tribes are not adequately organized to 
perform that function.”105 Immediately, this concern presents a way in 
which Tribal Law Online could help to remedy Congressional fears about 
the state of criminal adjudication on American Indian reservations. 
Publishing the legal decisions made by tribal judges and providing free 
access to tribes’ codified criminal codes will show that the political 
institutions of American Indian nations are sophisticated and fully capable 
of adjudicating crimes. This could present Congress with the proof it needs 
 
 
 99. See Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162. 25 U.S.C. §§ 
1321–1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)); Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State 
Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632–34 (1998) (giving an overview of 
Public Law 280).  
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2012). These states include Alaska (added after it achieved statehood in 
1958), California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id.  
 101. Id. Several American Indian Nations within Minnesota, Alaska, and Oregon are explicitly 
exempted from State criminal jurisdiction in § 1162(a). Id.  
 102. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152–1153 (2012).  
 103. See Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First 
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 701 (2006). 
 104. See Jiménez & Song, supra note 99, at 1659. This is in spite of the fact that federal adjudication 
of crimes that occurred on American Indian reservations was “typically neither well financed, nor 
vigorous,” likely dramatically exacerbating the problem of “lawlessness.” Carole E. Goldberg, Public 
Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA. L. REV. 535, 541 (1975).  
 105. S. Rep. No. 83-699, at 5 (1953).  
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to either abrogate Public Law 280 or eliminate it altogether.  
While many legal scholars have criticized Public Law 280 for being 
ineffective and wholly offensive to the cause of American Indian 
sovereignty,106 outcry against Public Law 280 has not been unanimous. 
Some economic scholars have noted that Public Law 280 has been effective 
at increasing the economic prosperity of the American Indian nations it 
affects, because it has allowed outside businesses that are interested in doing 
business on and with American Indian nations to rely upon state rule-of-law 
and on institutions that are perceived as being more stable and reliable.107 
Tribal Law Online may help to achieve those laudable goals in ways that 
are less offensive to American Indian sovereignty. Because businesses 
potentially interested in working on and with American Indian reservations 
will share free access to Tribal Law Online, their legal teams will be able to 
more accurately gauge their respective codes and case law. Tribal Law 
Online will also aid these businesses in communicating with American 
Indian authorities, as it will be far easier to discuss which specific provisions 
and decisions are potentially dissuading businesses from engaging with 
their Nations. Furthermore, it may provide concrete and easily accessible 
evidence showing that American Indian courts are fair and do not show 
favoritism in their decision-making.108 
D. Helping American Indian Voices More Directly Shape Laws and 
Government 
 
 
 106. See Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 103 (providing statistical evidence indicating that the 
residents of American Indian reservations affected by Public Law 280 are considerably less likely to 
have faith in the criminal adjudicative process); Jiménez & Song, supra note 99, at 1705 (castigating 
Public Law 280 because it “impedes the full realization of tribal self-government, not only because it 
intrudes upon tribal authority, but because it creates uncertainty regarding the scope of tribal authority”); 
Goldberg, supra note 53, at 1064 (noting that many American Indian Nations affected by Public Law 
280 have called for retrocession because “they wanted to make their justice systems more consistent 
with tribal priorities and values, and because they were receiving inadequate services from state criminal 
justice systems”). 
 107. See Anderson & Parker, supra note 60, at 647; but see Goldberg supra note 53, at 1045–47 
(advocating that Anderson and Parker’s endorsement of Public Law 280 be read “with skepticism” 
because it contradicts other scholarly research indicating that providing American Indian Nations with 
more control over their own laws increases their economic success, because it contradicts “the federal 
Indian policy that has prevailed for the past forty years” and because their “notion that state justice is 
better for Indians than tribal justice goes against the expressed preferences of tribal communities”). 
 108. Evidence of this already exists, though discovering it currently requires searching through legal 
databases that require more expertise than directly evaluating decisions made by tribal courts. See Nell 
Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 285, 352 (1997) (noting that “non-Indian parties were treated fairly” in all twenty 
American Indian courts studied by the author). 
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Many American Indian constitutions and laws are modeled directly after 
U.S. judicial systems.109 Initially, this occurred because the first 
constitutions that were drafted for American Indian nations following the 
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 were written not by 
American Indians, but by people working for the Department of the Interior 
or the Bureau of Indian Affairs.110 Many procedural laws, such as the rules 
of evidence and court procedure, also mirror federal or state laws.111 This 
presents a problem, as oftentimes, these laws and structures run counter to 
individualized American Indian nations’ norms governing dispute 
adjudication and justice.112 Where these laws fail to represent the tribe’s 
norms, the people lose faith in their governmental institutions and the laws 
fail to adequately represent their interests and beliefs.113 
Members of the Blackfoot Nation in the early 21st century attempted to 
re-draft the Blackfoot Constitution to more accurately represent the norms 
and values of its people.114 Proponents attempting to create the new 
Constitution went “door-to-door to share the draft with citizens,” and even 
read the document as it currently existed aloud to “illiterate members of the 
tribe in order to ensure that educational privilege [did] not exclude 
anyone.”115 The resulting constitution in some ways mirrored U.S. 
jurisprudential values, as it included individual rights of religion, speech, 
due process, and to keep and bear arms.116 However, in many ways, it 
diverged dramatically from traditional U.S. norms. The drafted Constitution 
provided individual rights to “Education, Housing, Medicine, and 
 
 
 109. See Cornell, supra note 64, at 366; Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, American 
Indian Law Codes: Pragmatic Law and Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 29, 49 (2008) (pointing out 
that “[m]any tribes quickly adapted the American government template for their own use” after the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934). 
 110. See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 841, 
927 (1990); Newton, supra note 108, at 334. It is worth noting, however, that not all American Indian 
nations have jurisprudential norms and values that are all that dissimilar from the U.S. See infra note 
148.  
 111. See Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
567, 582 (2012) (“[a]lthough exact numbers are not available, a large number of tribal courts also apply 
rules of procedure and evidence that resemble procedural and evidentiary rules used in non-Indian 
jurisdictions in the United States”); c.f. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 109, at 49.  
 112. See Cornell, supra note 64, at 365–66.  
 113. Id. at 367.  
 114. Taiawagi Helton, Nation Building in Indian Country: The Blackfoot Constitutional Review, 13 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 23–24 (2003).  
 115. Id. While this proposed Constitution was designed to manifestly represent the will of Blackfoot 
members, the Constitution did draw on “the values articulated” by several foreign nations, such as South 
Africa and the Netherlands. Id. at 24. 
 116. Id. at 25–26. 
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Subsistence,”117 included a clause binding the Blackfoot Nation to “devote 
itself to just, equitable and sustainable” environmental policies,118 and 
created a “’holistic’ judiciary . . . which recognize[d] no distinction between 
criminal offenses and civil wrongs,” focusing instead on “healing and social 
prosperity.”119 In short, it was a Constitution designed to represent the 
“Blackfoot People, guided by their own traditions of justice.”120 
Tribal Law Online provides an opportunity for the members of the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe to make their laws and procedures decidedly more 
Oglala. By providing free access to a clear, codified database of current 
Oglala laws, citizens will be able to more clearly determine what the law in 
Pine Ridge is, and consequently discover more easily which laws do not 
conform to their own values. It will be easier for Oglala citizens to point out 
these laws to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council and help their representatives 
amend and alter them to more accurately serve their needs. It will provide 
more accountability as well, as laws passed by the Tribal Council will be 
readily available to the public shortly after they are drafted. Publication of 
judicial decisions will ensure that Oglala citizens can easily discover how 
judges are interpreting Oglala laws and determine if these interpretations 
are adequately serving their values. Lastly, as these benefits take effect, 
other American Indian nations and outsiders will be able to access the 
database and see what Oglala norms of law and justice look like. This could 
help these Nations create laws and dispel the myth of “lawlessness” in 
Indian country.  
All in all, Tribal Law Online could very likely eliminate many of the 
erroneous perceptions and stereotypes outsiders have of American Indian 
codes and American Indian courts. It has the potential to unseat the 
assumptions that have undergirded legislation and Supreme Court opinions, 
and it has the potential to increase nationwide trust in the procedures and 
functions of American Indian law. Perhaps most importantly, it has the 
potential to help participants create and draft codes that more accurately 
represent their own values.  
II. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF TRIBAL LAW ONLINE 
Despite all of these potential advantages, support for the broad 
codification and publication of tribal law is not unanimous. Several 
 
 
 117. Id. at 26 (footnotes omitted). 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 27.  
 120. Id. at 28. 
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respected legal scholars and American Indian jurists have argued that broad 
publication of tribal law could in fact impede the sovereignty of American 
Indian nations and limit the ability of their citizens to access courts and mold 
the government. This Part will address (A) criticism that having 
nonmembers codify Oglala law could result in those nonmembers having 
an undue influence on the final result, (B) criticism that the very act of 
codifying American Indian laws necessarily imposes Anglo-American 
jurisprudential norms, and (C) concerns that codification could have a 
negative effect on customary law.  
A. Issues with Nonmembers Codifying the Tribe’s Laws 
One concern is that giving the project of codifying and publishing 
existing laws to parties other than members of the Nation could reduce the 
Nation’s control over the final product.121 For the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the 
very act of codifying the Tribe’s resolutions and ordinances necessarily 
involves making editorial choices about what pieces of resolutions and 
ordinances to include in the final product of a section. Oglala Sioux 
resolutions and ordinances include multiple “whereas” clauses explaining 
the authority of the Tribal Council to pass specific pieces of legislation and 
providing reasons why the resolutions and ordinances are necessary.122 
Similarly, since the Oglala Sioux Code has not been codified since 1996, 
there are conflicts and overlap between ordinances.123 Choosing which 
language to include and picking which overlapping or conflicting 
resolutions represent the most accurate expressions of the law involves 
making interpretive decisions about what the law is. Indeed, the very act of 
putting together the code into a subject arrangement requires answering 
questions about where laws belong in the grand scheme of the Code. Putting 
these interpretive tasks in the hands of non-Oglala parties could result in 
changes to the code that run counter to the intent of the Tribal Council and 
the Oglala people.  
CERL has recognized that this could be a possible issue, and it has thus 
instituted certain procedural safeguards to prevent this kind of harm from 
occurring.124 First, the Project requires that the Oglala Sioux Tribe formally 
 
 
 121. See Shucha, supra note 6, at 205 (expressing concern that allowing a third party to codify and 
publish tribal laws could reduce the influence of the Tribe’s constituents on them).  
 122. See generally Oglala Sioux Tribe, Resolution 15-88 (Apr. 28, 2015) (on file with the author) 
(authorizing the Tribal Law Online project by resolution of the Oglala Sioux Tribe).  
 123. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4.  
 124. See Shucha, supra note 6, at 205 (pointing out that it is likely that any codification efforts made 
by third parties would work in close concert with tribal clients in order to prevent these issues from 
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adopt the final codified product.125 Second, one of the main participants in 
this project, Professor Steve Gunn, is one of the Oglala Sioux Tribe’s 
attorneys.126 The final codification will be formally presented to and 
discussed with the Tribal Council by Professor Gunn,127 to help limit the 
likelihood of accidental alterations to the laws. 
None of these procedural safeguards can strictly ensure that issues of 
interpretation will be resolved by Oglala parties. However, they do show 
that CERL has taken the potential issue seriously. The Tribal Council is free 
to reject any sections of code that do not accurately represent its legislation, 
and CERL has expressed a willingness to present issues involving 
interpretation to the Tribal Council to limit any potential corrupting 
influence.  
B. Concerns that Codification Imposes Anglo-American Legal Norms on 
American Indian Nations 
A greater concern is that the very act of codifying and widely 
disseminating the law could harm sovereignty by imposing a culture onto 
American Indian nations that runs counter to their norms. Robert B. Porter, 
a former Attorney General for the Seneca Nation of Indians, argues that the 
imposition of Anglo-American legal norms could ultimately have the effect 
of eliminating the sovereignty of American Indian nations altogether.128 The 
American system of adversarial justice, Porter argues, runs counter to the 
“[p]eacemaking” tradition that is the “primary method of dispute resolution 
traditionally found in indigenous communities.”129 The main difference 
between the peacemaking method of adjudication and the more adversarial 
American model is that “peacemaking is concerned with justice as it relates 
to the benefit of the community, and not just for the benefit of individual 
members.”130 It is essentially a mediating process131 that does not involve 
representation by lawyers132 and is held before an interested, rather than a 
disinterested, mediator.133 
 
 
coming to fruition).  
 125. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-
American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235 (1997).  
 129. Id. at 251.  
 130. Id. at 252.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 253.  
 133. Id.  
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Most problematically for Tribal Law Online, Porter argues that the 
peacemaking tradition of justice relies upon a lack of formally written 
laws.134 He alleges that the advantage of norms and policies being translated 
“orally rather than through written edicts” is that it allows “the ‘law’ [to] be 
utilized by the parties as more of a guide to achieving substantial justice, 
rather than as an additional source of rigidity that might prevent the parties 
from adjusting their positions towards a point of compromise.”135 He is also 
concerned that a “reliance [on] fixed procedural and substantive law” can 
perpetuate “a destructive belief in the mind of the parties (and maybe even 
the judge) that technical correctness is more important than justice.”136 This 
could thus prevent the parties from seeking out inventive and creative 
solutions that are made with a mind towards benefitting the community as 
a whole rather than simply adjudicating guilt.137 
There are two overarching concerns with imposing Anglo-American 
norms of adversarial justice on the Oglala Sioux Tribe. On the one hand, it 
could amount to lawyers working for CERL unwittingly imposing outside 
influences onto an Oglala culture that may or may not be suited to it. Porter 
argues that “[l]aw school training . . . is a type of boot camp that tears down 
the non-lawyer civilian and rebuilds him or her in the image of the dominant 
society’s lawyer-soldier”138 and is worried that the outside influence 
imposed on lawyers by law school could cause them to steer and guide 
American Indian nations into adopting legal systems that have more in 
common with the American system than their own culture.139 This could be 
an “accidental” way of enforcing the federal policies of the “Assimilation 
era”140 towards American Indians.141 Porter argues that this could even lead 
to the Federal Government feeling that it can no longer “justify the legal 
barrier that exists between the two sovereignties” which could cause it to 
“move, once again, to terminate its recognition of tribal sovereignty.”142  
 
 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 281.  
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 303. 
 139. Id. at 303–04.  
 140. The “Assimilation era” is a loose term describing Congress’s policy towards American Indian 
interests from 1871 to 1928. See David M. Blurton, ANCSA Corporation Lands and the Dependent 
Indian Community Category of Indian Country, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 211, 227 n.120 (1996). This “era” 
was characterized by an attempt to force American Indians to assimilate into white U.S. culture. Id. at 
227.  
 141. Porter, supra note 128, at 281–83.  
 142. Id. at 283.  
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Similarly, adopting a formal Code may in and of itself be an imposition 
onto individual Nations’ cultures. Several American Indian nations have 
implemented some form of peacemaking courts in their judicial systems.143 
In fact, in recent years, there has been a resurgence of American Indian 
nations utilizing more traditional forms of dispute resolution.144 A former 
Chief Judge of the Jicarilla Apache Supreme Court has noted that 
“Mainstream Americans . . . . do not seem to understand that . . . the 
institution of the courts and the workings of an adversarial system of justice 
. . . amount to a large portion of American culture.”145 He further notes that 
many attempts to impose American judicial norms have weakened the 
cultures of American Indian nations.146 Indeed, surveys of American Indian 
courts have noted that judges in American Indian nations prefer not to be as 
strictly bound by stare decisis as state and federal courts are.147 Porter’s 
concerns, therefore, about imposing outside norms of American justice onto 
American Indian nations such as the Oglala Sioux Tribe may be well-
founded. It certainly presents a concern that the very act of codifying the 
laws of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and providing free access to a Westlaw-like 
system could have the unfortunate accidental result of limiting the influence 
Oglala culture has on the law in Pine Ridge.  
Of course, it is important to note that many American Indian nations 
have had an adversarial system of justice for almost two hundred years.148 
Not all Nations utilized a method of dispute adjudication similar to the 
“peacemaking” method described by Porter. The Oglala Sioux Tribe, 
however, did utilize a system that was certainly somewhat comparable. 
Sioux justice was traditionally dispensed through the tiospaye, or extended 
family.149 Like the peacemaking courts, these units focused on restoring 
 
 
 143. The Navajo are well known for implementing a two-tier court system, in which some disputes 
are adjudicated by the Peacemakers Court, and others by a more traditional legal body. Id. at 302. The 
Jicarilla Apache make use of a similar system. See Carey N. Vicenti, The Reemergence of Tribal Society 
and Traditional Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 134, 137–39, 140 (1995) (describing the traditional 
Apache methods of adjudication, then explaining how the traditional norms are applied by the Jicarilla 
Apache).  
 144. See Vicenti, supra note 143 at 139.  
 145. Id. at 135.  
 146. Former Chief Judge Vicenti notes that the impositions placed on the courts by the Indian Civil 
Rights Act have represented “the demise of traditional values and practice.” Id. at 137.  
 147. See Cooter & Fikentscher supra note 109, at 66–67 (pointing out that most judges of American 
Indian Nations do not rely upon past precedents, limiting their value in developing the common law).  
 148. For example, the Creek, Cherokee, and Choctaw all very readily adopted American 
governmental and adjudicatory norms. See Porter, supra note 128, at 265. The Cherokee at the time of 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) had codified their laws and adjudicated disputes 
through an adversarial system similar to that of the United States. ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & 
KRAKOFF, supra note 27, at 76.  
 149. See REINHARDT, supra note 4, at 80; ROBERT M. UTLEY, THE LANCE AND THE SHIELD: THE 
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community harmony rather than adjudicating guilt and punishing parties.150 
While this method of adjudication is not identical to that of the Peacemakers 
Court of the Navajo, it certainly seems to reflect some similar interests. It 
also seems somewhat antithetical to the American adversarial system of 
justice.  
However, it is important to note that the Oglala Sioux Tribe currently 
uses a two-tiered legal system with trial courts and a Supreme Court.151 The 
Tribe has also not been opposed to formally codifying its laws in the past; 
it put all of its laws together into a single code in 1996.152 Similarly, the 
resolution passed by the Oglala Sioux Tribe formally adopting this project 
states that “codification . . . will strengthen our Tribal government, promote 
economic development, and help us educate our youth in the laws, customs, 
and traditions of our people.”153 This particular “whereas” clause of the 
Resolution clearly shows that the Oglala Sioux Tribe believes that 
codification is in the best interest of the Tribe’s sovereignty.  
Now, the Oglala Sioux Tribe may decide to readopt some form of 
tiospaye justice in the future,154 but it is difficult to see how formally 
codifying the current laws and tribal court decisions could interfere with 
that. One of Porter’s issues with adopting a formally codified system of laws 
is that it decreases the access of ordinary people to justice.155 However, the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe already has a system of codified laws that is essentially 
unavailable to ordinary people without access to the government directory 
or the resources to spend sorting through it. Publishing all the laws in a 
subject arrangement on a website with free access will greatly increase the 
availability and usability of the law not just to outside businesses, but also 
for tribal residents who currently have almost no access to the 1996 
codification, much less the legislation that has been passed since then.  
It is also possible that formally digesting the court decisions of the 
Oglala could begin imposing American stare decisis norms and common 
 
 
LIFE AND TIMES OF SITTING BULL 8–9 (1993).  
 150. UTLEY supra note 149, at 9. In fact, the landmark case of Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 
(1883), was originally litigated because a federal Indian agent did not believe that the Brule Sioux’s 
system of justice had adequately punished a murderer. No attempt was made by the tribe to determine 
whether the killing was just; instead, the accused was required to compensate the victim’s family with 
$600, eight horses, and one blanket. ANDERSON, BERGER, FRICKEY & KRAKOFF, supra note 27, at 93.  
 151. See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4.  
 152. See Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra note 6, at 4.  
 153. See Oglala Sioux Tribe Resolution 15-88 (Apr. 28, 2015) (on file with the author). 
 154. There may be some push to reinstitute some more traditional methods of dispute resolution in 
Pine Ridge. For example, the newly constructed Pine Ridge Courthouse contains a room devoted to 
“alternative dispute resolution.” See Interview with Steve Gunn, supra note 4. 
 155. See Porter, supra note 128, at 260.  
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law traditions onto the Oglala. Right now, due to the state of the law, it is 
difficult to state with certainty what emphasis the Oglala courts place on 
precedent. However, publishing and digesting court decisions could provide 
a venue for courts to explain, in a formal and public way, their 
understanding of Tribal precedents. Instead of imposing American judicial 
norms, digesting Oglala court decisions could provide the Oglala courts 
with a public voice that they have not had before. It could allow Oglala 
judicial norms to be publicly broadcast. It may also prevent outside lawyers, 
arguing in Tribal Court, from assuming that the American common law 
tradition applies. Furthermore, it could allow the Oglala to communicate 
their judicial norms to outside American Indian audiences, who may be 
interested in using them to strengthen their own tribal sovereignty through 
their own judicial systems.156  
It is also worth noting that, simply as a practical matter, tribal 
sovereignty will likely be better served in the immediate by codifying and 
disseminating Oglala laws and court decisions. For one, it is no secret that 
many of the decisions that have had the greatest effect on American Indian 
nations have been decided without American Indian involvement.157 
Increasing the accessibility and prevalence of Oglala law could thus 
increase the ability of the Oglala to assert it before tribunals and for it to be 
used and considered by other Indian courts and legislative bodies. It is also 
generally believed that “the U.S. Supreme Court has taken up the standard 
as the enemy of tribal rights.”158 Given the immediate threats that decisions 
such as Oliphant and Hicks present to American Indian sovereignty,159 the 
Oglala and other American Indian nations’ causes may be best served by 
 
 
 156. Some legal scholars have alleged that there is nothing “cultural” about the Peacemaking 
traditions of American Indian Nations. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Custom, Tribal Court Practice, and 
Popular Justice, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 117, 130–31 (2001). Joh argues specifically that the Navajo 
Peacemakers Court ought not to be considered a cultural institution. Id at 124–25. This is because its use 
of custom does not “extend[] far beyond European contact,” since it was derived from multiple 
(including non-Indian) sources. Id. at 125. Also, it “has more symbolic than practical value as an 
adjudicatory forum.” Id. Joh argues that what is traditionally considered American Indian customary law 
is, in fact, an outlet for “popular justice” concepts, which are Western in origin. Id. at 125–28. However, 
it is unclear why American Indian methods of judicial adjudication need to be hundreds of years old for 
them to be valid expressions of the modern culture of an American Indian Nation. It is also unclear why 
borrowing and adopting concepts from non-Indian sources prevents the Peacemakers Court from being 
a valid expression of Navajo culture. The article’s persuasiveness suffers from assuming that culture is 
a fixed, rather than evolving concept and that cultures cannot be influenced by one another and remain 
distinct.  
 157. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 
5, 7 (2004) (pointing out that “[t]o a striking degree, federal Indian law has been made in the absence of 
the voices of the people it most intimately affects.”). 
 158. Id. at 19.  
 159. See discussion supra Part I(A).  
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disseminating laws and court opinions that draw respect from outside 
sources and help the American Indian community to speak with unified 
voices.160 
It is hard to say with certainty whether codification in and of itself is an 
Anglo-American judicial method that could hinder the ability of Oglala 
culture to drive Oglala courts. However, the procedural safeguards and the 
mere fact that the Oglala have codified their laws in the past shows that, at 
the very least, the Oglala Sioux Tribe believes that partnering with CERL 
will have a positive rather than negative effect on their Nation’s sovereignty.  
C. Concerns that Codification Could Harm Customary Law 
CERL may also need to be concerned with the effect codification could 
have on the customary law of American Indian nations.161 Many American 
Indian nations continue to make use of customary law in their adjudicative 
processes.162 Customary law differs from more formal law in that it is more 
dependent upon the dispositions of the cultural community than on the more 
rigid processes that govern Anglo-American traditional jurisprudence.163 
For that reason, codification may have unfortunate effects upon customary 
law that are more difficult to foresee than the effects upon more formalized 
laws and court decisions.  
A good example of the effect that codification can have upon customary 
law comes from the unique case of Lesotho and the Laws of Lerotholi. It is 
helpful to point out that Lesotho shares a lot of characteristics with 
 
 
 160. Indeed, tribal law systems that emphasize traditional American Indian systems of justice have 
been considered by the Supreme Court as reasons to deny tribal courts jurisdiction in certain cases. For 
example, a member of the Pueblo of Jemez tribe wrote an article describing the more holistic form of 
justice employed by many American Indian Nations. See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems 
and Tribal Society, 79 JUDICATURE 126 (1995); see also discussion supra Part II. Justice Souter cited 
this article in his concurring opinion in Nevada v. Hicks as evidence that tribal law “would be unusually 
difficult for an outsider to sort out,” and to justify denying an American Indian court jurisdiction over a 
civil dispute. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384–85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).  
 161. Customary law is formally defined in the context of indigenous peoples of Africa as “rules of 
custom, morality, and religion that the indigenous people of a given locality view as enforceable either 
by the central political system or authority . . . or by various social units such as the family.” Modibo 
Ocran, The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Africa, 39 AKRON L. REV. 465, 467 (2006). This Note uses the term simply to mean laws based on the 
traditional cultures and norms of American Indian nations that may or may not be similar to U.S. legal 
norms.  
 162. See Porter, supra note 128 at 301 (discussing the customary law practices of the Navajo 
Peacemaker courts); Vicenti, supra note 143 at 140–41 (categorizing how customary law is applied by 
American Indian Nations).  
 163. See Porter, supra note 128 at 257–58 (discussing the customary law practices of traditional 
Navajo peacemaking); Vicenti, supra note 143 at 137–38 (discussing traditional Apache norms of justice 
and adjudication).  
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American Indian nations in the United States. Like American Indian 
nations, Lesotho was the subject of colonization by a foreign, European 
power.164 Like American Indian nations, Lesotho lies entirely within 
another country165 that has inherited the British common law tradition.166 
Like American Indian nations, Lesotho’s traditional methods of 
adjudication vary widely from the British common law tradition.167 Lastly, 
Lesotho is recognized as a sovereign nation.168  
In 1903, the Basutoland169 National Council convened to “compile the 
Basotho traditional laws and reconcile them with the ‘laws of 
Moshoeshoe.’”170 This process resulted in the creation of the Laws of 
Lerotholi, a codification of customary Lesotho laws concerning topics 
ranging from Khotla procedure to marriage law to theft.171 The Laws of 
Lerotholi have since been updated; “the current version of them is 
substantially a merger of the original version from 1903 with the subsequent 
amendments, rules, and orders made by the Paramount Chief in pursuance 
 
 
 164. See Laurence Juma, The Laws of Lerotholi: Role and Status of Codified Rules of Custom in the 
Kingdom of Lesotho, 23 PACE INT’L L. REV. 92, 101 (2011).  
 165. Id. at 97.  
 166. See Amanda Barratt & Pamela Snyman, Researching South African Law, LLRX (Oct. 1, 2002), 
http://www.llrx.com/2002/10/features-researching-south-african-law/ [https://perma.cc/YC2H-WSEP].  
 167. Juma, supra note 164, at 100–01. Now, it is true that Lesotho’s method of traditional 
adjudication did not necessarily line up with the Oglala Sioux Tribe or with other American Indian 
Nations. Lesotho (then called Basotho) was created in the first half of the 19th century by King 
Moshoeshoe out of refugees fleeing social upheavals and drought. Id. at 98–99. The traditional chiefdom 
system was organized into a kind of oligarchy, with Moshoeshoe and his ruling class presiding over the 
smaller, traditional Basotho chiefs. Id. at 99. The court system, called the Khotla, was presided over by 
chiefs, and while the goal of the Khotla was to restore community harmony, it seems to have been 
somewhat adversarial. Id. at 105 & n.71. This, of course, is much different than the Sioux, who 
historically were very decentralized, see UTLEY, supra note 149, at 9, and whose tiospaye method of 
adjudication was non-adversarial. See discussion supra Part II. However, the purpose of this section has 
less to do with any specific version of customary law than it does with the effect of codification upon 
customary law in general. As such, these differences do not prevent this comparison from being 
illustrative.  
 168. Lesotho gained its independence from Great Britain in 1966. SCOTT ROSENBERG, RICHARD F. 
WEISFELDER & MICHELLE FRISBIE-FULTON, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF LESOTHO xxxviii (2004). Of 
course, American Indian Nations are not sovereigns in the same sense as Lesotho, as they are not wholly 
separate nations. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831) (holding that American 
Indian Nations are to be considered “domestic dependent nations” in American law). However, 
American jurisprudence has routinely affirmed the sovereign status of American Indian Nations within 
the United States. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030–31 (2014) (calling 
the sovereign status of American Indian Nations “settled law” and characterizing them as “separate 
sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution” (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 
(1978))). The comparison with Lesotho in this regard, while not perfect, is still apt for the purpose of 
evaluating codification’s effect on customary law.  
 169. Another term for Lesotho. See Juma, supra note 164, at 102.  
 170. Id. at 116.  
 171. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/9
  
 
 
 
 
2017] DIGITIZING TRIBAL LAW 1053 
 
 
 
 
to Native Administration Proclamation No. 61 of 1938.”172 In 1965, the 
Central and Local Courts Proclamation effectively rendered customary law 
“inferior” to all other written law, subordinating the Laws of Lerotholi via 
a “repugnancy clause” which asserted the primacy of British principles of 
law whenever they came in conflict with a different native law.173 While this 
principle remained with Lesotho after its independence in 1966,174 “the 
[Lesotho] courts have resorted to the Laws of Lerotholi” to determine the 
content of custom in a myriad of cases where customary law has been found 
to be the applicable law.175  
One of the unfortunate results of codification in the case of the Laws of 
Lerotholi is that the code has ”been outpaced by the changes in Basuto social 
life” and applied seemingly arbitrarily by the Lesotho courts.176 The Laws 
of Lerotholi are “regarded only as one of the sources of customary rules.”177 
Courts have declined to apply the Laws of Lerotholi if there is any other 
legislation on the issue it is hearing.178 Perhaps most perplexingly, judges 
have refused to apply the Laws of Lerotholi in any situations in which they 
seem as though they have been “outpaced by the changes in the Basuto 
social life,” which means that many of its laws are not applied in a consistent 
fashion.179 This has raised concerns that the Courts will begin to follow 
South African jurisprudence ahead of Lesotho customs and culture in 
matters that concern human rights norms.180 
The problems that codification has caused in Lesotho raise significant 
concern for Tribal Law Online and the codification of Oglala laws that 
invoke customary or traditional law. One of the goals of CERL in engaging 
in this process is to make Oglala law accessible and predictable.181 The hope 
is that doing so will make it easier for parties to litigate cases and use Oglala 
courts, as well as entice outsiders to do business with and in Pine Ridge.182 
 
 
 172. Id. at 116–17.  
 173. Id. at 118–19.  
 174. “[C]ustomary law has remained subordinate to ‘western law’” in Lesotho. Id. at 119. 
 175. Id. at 119.  
 176. Id. at 121. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id at 122.  
 179. Id. Taufik Cotran, Chief Justice of Lesotho from 1976 to 1990, stated: 
I think a large part of the difficulties encountered in these cases has arisen because attempts 
have been made to reduce customs, but not all others, and in haphazard fashion . . . into ink and 
paper with the result that the written words have assumed a quality of rigidity out of all 
proportion to their true meaning or significance. 
Id. at 123 (quoting Ramaisa v. Mpholenyane, 1977 LLR 149).  
 180. Id. at 121–22.  
 181. See Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra note 6, at 4. 
 182. See discussion, supra Part I(D).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1054 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1025 
 
 
 
 
The mere existence of a code will not help to stimulate these situations if 
the code is haphazardly followed and inconsistently applied. Indeed, this 
application evokes the current state of the laws in Pine Ridge, where the 
only available codification has been out of date for twenty years.183 It may 
also cause the Oglala courts to rely upon federal and South Dakota law to 
help adjudicate disputes, removing distinct Oglala voices from the 
application of the law.  
One possible distinction that could be made between the Laws of 
Lerotholi and Tribal Law Online is the existence of the “repugnancy” 
doctrine in Lesotho law that has influenced the application of the Laws of 
Lerotholi by the Lesotho courts. However, while the Oglala are not bound 
by an identical repugnancy doctrine, they are still bound to federal law via 
the plenary power doctrine.184 This doctrine means that tribal law is required 
to defer to federal law in certain contexts, regardless of the applicability of 
customary or traditional law to that situation.185 It is important to note, 
however, that this binds tribal law to a significantly smaller extent than does 
repugnancy doctrine; American Indian nations have enjoyed significant 
leeway in interpreting federal law, often declining to adhere to Supreme 
Court interpretations of terms such as “due process.”186 
Perhaps a more important distinction lies in the fact that Lesotho is a 
common law country plagued by inadequate case reporting,187 while CERL 
seeks to report and codify Oglala court cases as a part of Tribal Law 
Online.188 This has had the effect of making “Basotho courts less attuned to 
developing their own jurisprudence, let alone that of customary law.”189 It 
has also increased Lesotho reliance on South African jurisprudence, because 
the poor reporting means that the “Court of Appeal is seldom in a position 
to discuss legal principles in a wholesome manner.”190 This means that 
“South African text books written by people who did not have Lesotho in 
mind and were not aware of difference between the law of Lesotho and that 
 
 
 183. See Application of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, supra note 6, at 4. 
 184. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903) (establishing that the Congress has 
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of the Republic of South Africa are commonly used,” which results in the 
non-application of Lesotho cultural norms and legal principles to Lesotho 
cases.191 
This is strikingly similar to the current state of case reporting in Indian 
country. The Indian Law Reporter, one of the only reporters available for 
tribal court decisions, only reports on a select number of cases from “a few 
dozen tribes.”192 Several American Indian nations, such as the Navajo, 
report their own decisions, but most do not.193 Westlaw offers incomplete 
reporting of the court decisions of twenty-four tribes, but they charge a fee 
on top of their ordinary charges for access.194 This has made it extremely 
hard to identify legal precedent in most tribal courts. 
However, Tribal Law Online, should it be successful in its attempt to 
report and codify Oglala court decisions, would not be susceptible to these 
issues. Accessing Oglala precedent would be as easy as logging on to Tribal 
Law Online and conducting subject matter searches. The Oglala courts 
would be able to access previous opinions and apply Oglala precedent, and 
there would be much less need to rely on outside precedents from places 
like South Dakota in adjudicating decisions. This may also have a big effect 
on the effectiveness and fluidity of customary law. While the codification 
of Oglala law would still be “rigid” in the sense that Oglala courts would be 
forced to apply the laws, decisions of the Oglala courts that applied laws in 
ways that offended the customary values of Oglala culture would be widely 
published and easily discovered. People will find it much easier to discover 
acts of the judiciary that contradict current Oglala cultural norms, and would 
similarly be able to suggest specific changes to the Oglala code to the Oglala 
Sioux Tribal Council. A vital element of communication between the courts 
and the cultural communities they serve, currently absent in Lesotho, would 
be filled, which would help the system to function. Nevertheless, CERL 
would be well-advised to keep in mind how necessary fluidity is to 
customary law and reflect that in the Tribal Law Online Project.  
CONCLUSION 
While there are potential pitfalls, Tribal Law Online and projects like it 
could redefine the way tribal law is perceived in the U.S. legal system. The 
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53.  
 193. Id.  
 194. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1056 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1025 
 
 
 
 
potential advances it could bring to the cause of American Indian 
sovereignty and to the lives of American Indians are immeasurable in their 
value. While care needs to be taken to prevent these new publications from 
minimizing the voices of American Indian peoples in how they wish to be 
governed, it is difficult to overstate how important Tribal Law Online and 
projects like it could be to American Indian nations.  
Jacob Franchek 
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